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Modern rationality, despite its treatment as an atemporal category that universalizes the human experience and that 
orients us collectively toward the discovery of "the truth," is an historic human construct that begs critical assessment. 
Of primary interest here is the fact that modernity's tendency toward dichotomous interpretations of the world conflates 
rationality with certain human traits and absolutely opposes it to others. The result is not only a bifurcated human 
experience but also an epistemology that arbitrarily grants knowing authority to some while denying others this 
privileged status. For these reasons, modem rationality must be understood for its philosophical and political 
implications. 
RESUME 
La rationalite modeme, malgre son traitement comme une categorie atemporelle qui universalise l'experience humaine 
et nous oriente collectivement vers la decouverte de la «verite», est une construction mentale historique des humains 
qui necessite une evaluation critique. Le plus interessant est le fait que la tendance modeme envers des interpretations 
dichotomiques du monde confond la rationalite' et certaines caracteristiques humaines et oppose categoriquement la 
rationalite' a d'autres caractdristiques. Le resultat est non seulement une experience humaine bifurquee mais aussi une 
epist^ mologie qui attribue arbitrairement l'autorite de la connaissance a certains et refuse ce statut privilegie a d'autres. 
La rationalite' modeme doit done etre comprise en raison de ses repercussions philosophiques et politiques. 
"Know who's playing the music before you dance " 
Black poet Nikki Giovanni 
on white philosophy 
R ATIONALITY HAS EMERGED IN THE MOD-ern world not only as a human tool for the assessment of "truth," but also as a 
human asset which figures largely in our as-
sessment of one another's character.1 Ration-
ality, modernity claims, is the human trait that 
transcends our differences and universalizes 
the human experience. However, a closer look 
at the terms o f modern rationality reveals that 
its universality is a myth. Only specific types 
of individuals fully measure up to its terms 
and benefit from the status o f the "rational in-
dividual, thereby disadvantaging the greater 
part of humanity. The modern occupation with 
the Cartesian ego, and the effects of which 
social contractarianism's public and private 
have entrenched and expanded, are at the root 
of the oppressive terms o f modern rationality. 
Despite Cartesianism's and liberalism's claim 
to the universal individual, their dichotomous 
terms conflate rationality with specific human 
attributes and oppose it to others, thereby 
granting some individuals more epistemic au-
thority than others. Thus it is on both philo-
sophical and political grounds that rationality 
must be critiqued, and for which its terms 
must be revisited in the modern project o f 
empowerment. 
Rationality's Autonomous Individual 
and the Public/Private Separation 
The concept o f rationality has not been static 
since antiquity; it has a particular modern 
expression. A s Genevieve L l o y d demonstrates, 
rationality through time has been associated 
with shifting norms of masculinity. For in-
stance, some early philosophers, including 
Phi lo , Augustine and Aquinas, conceptualized 
rationality as a single paradigm of rational 
excellence for al l , believing men to be more 
able than women to attain such perfection. The 
Enlightenment and thinkers such as Rousseau 
entrenched the idea that men and women are 
essentially different, capable only o f attaining 
different and complementary orders o f per-
fection. Thus rationality became a paradigm 
for men, while women, relegated to a private 
sphere o f nurturing and affectivity, were 
permitted no appropriate relation to rational 
projects.2 
The story o f modern rationality finds its 
beginnings most clearly with Cartesian indi-
vidualism, and the attendant sharp polarization 
of mind and body. Descartes's reconceptual-
ization o f reason from a means o f persuasion 
to a consistent individual's instrument for the 
discovery o f truth lent it a quality o f trans-
cendence, impartiality, and universality. This 
rationality, Descartes believed, was a force for 
democracy. 
Descartes saw his method as opening the 
way to a new egalitarianism in knowl-
edge. In a letter written shortly after the 
publication of the Discourse on Method, 
he commented that his thoughts on meth-
od seemed to him appropriate to put in a 
book where he wished that "even women" 
might understand something.... Descartes' 
egalitarian intentions come out also in his 
insistence on writing the Discourse on 
Method in the vernacular, rather than in 
Latin, the learned language of the schools. 
The work, he stressed, should appeal to 
those who avail themselves only of their 
natural reason in its purity. The point was 
political as well as practical.... The accessi-
bility of the new method even to women 
was thus a powerful symbol of the trans-
formation which it marked in the relation-
ship between method and autonomous, 
individual reasoning.3 
With the entry o f the autonomous individ-
ual, Cartesian thought introduced a new epis-
temological framework grounded in the uni-
versality of knowing through reason. However, 
Descartes's treatment of reason as a highly 
unified and restricted mental activity fully 
distinct from corporeal life had the opposite 
effect than that foreseen. Because women were 
already historically and philosophically associ-
ated with bodily life, the separation of reason 
and corporeality reinforced and further deni-
grated their status as non-rational beings. 
This separation o f male and female author-
ity was further entrenched with the advent of 
contractarian philosophy, and its myth of soci-
ety's creation. C i v i l society was defined as a 
universal realm that includes all individuals, 
each of whom has contracted to legitimate the 
state's authority. A t the root o f modern 
thought, though, is contract theories' explicit 
separation and opposition o f the c iv i l public 
and the familial private. A s Carole Pateman 
argues: 
Only half the story appears in commen-
taries on the classic texts or in contempo-
rary Rawlsian arguments, because modern 
political theory is so thoroughly patriarchal 
that one aspect of its origins lies outside 
the analytical reach of most theorists. Po-
litical theorists argue about the individual, 
and take it for granted that their subject 
matter concerns the public world, without 
investigating the way in which the "indi-
vidual," "civil society," and "the public" 
have been constituted as patriarchal cate-
gories in opposition to womanly nature 
and the "private" sphere.4 
Thus, while mainstream thought often 
heralds social contractarianism as the defeat of 
patriarchy, it has in fact subsumed patriarchy 
in the public/private split, while silencing 
discussion on this point by pointing to the uni-
versality o f the "individual" who makes and 
lives the contract. Yet no genuinely free, con-
tracting individuals would subscribe to an 
arrangement that meant their subordination. 
Thus, implicit in the social contract is wom-
en's exclusion from the category of the auton-
omous individual. 
Liberal contractarianism's separation of 
the public and private, and its accompanying 
male/female dichotomy, reinforce and are fed 
by parallel oppositional dualisms. Dropped 
neatly along these polarized lines we find 
Descartes's mind/body and a consequent au-
tonomy/dependence dualism; the impartiality/ 
partiality inherent in universalist rational 
thought; modern science's subject/object split 
that follows close on the heels of Carte-
sianism; and the reason/emotion dichotomy 
that grows out of all of the accompanying 
dualisms. That is, Cartesianism and contractar-
ianism have tied together the public, maleness, 
mind, autonomy, impartiality, subject and 
reason, and valued these characteristics over 
the private, femaleness, corporeality, locality, 
object and emotion, which are similarly associ-
ated with one another. The political and philo-
sophical problem here is not that dichotomy is 
itself essentially oppressive, but rather that in 
presenting these divisions as factual or natural, 
and then by privileging one side o f the dual-
ism over the other, oppressive conditions 
arise. 5 Private is devalued as "not-public"; 
emotion, passion and affectivity depreciate as 
"not-reason," partiality is derogatorily deemed 
"not-universal," and so forth. M o i r a Gatens's 
assessment o f dichotomy is instructive. 
Take the mind/body distinction as an ex-
ample: it presents itself as a self-evident 
distinction, there is nothing to suggest that 
mind and body are given unequal value 
and each seems as if it is defined inter-
dependently. However, a close examination 
of the way these terms function in, say, the 
philosophy of Descartes, shows that mind 
is given a positive, and body a negative, 
value. What appears to be a distinction 
between A (mind) and B (body), in fact, 
takes the form of A (mind) and Not-A 
(body).6 
"Rationality" plays in this hierarchical 
system of dualities paradigmatically, serving as 
a general assessment of peoples' status. So 
much is expressed in the words, "His decision 
is rational," or, "She is behaving irrationally," 
in much the same way that "be a man" and 
"don't be such a woman" capture a whole 
series of meanings. Gatens offers a theoretical 
framework for this phenomenon. 
[A] dichotomy may function to divide a 
continuous field of differences (A, B, C, 
D) into an exclusive opposition with one 
term being singled out to define all the 
rest: A defines the entire field of Not-A. A 
is here defined in positive terms, as pos-
sessing x, y, z properties whereas its 
"opposite" is negatively defined. Not-A 
becomes defined by the fact that it lacks 
the properties x, y, z rather than being 
defined in its own right.7 
Thus, "being rational" (A) means being impar-
tial, mindful or intellectual, autonomous, the 
subject, and so forth, while being emotional 
(B), partial (C), bodily (D) and so forth are 
summarily deemed Not-Rational (Not-A). 
L l o y d has shown, for example, that while 
modern thought may not explicitly find 
women "irrational," it defines rationality in 
opposition to the womanly. 8 The subsequent 
examination o f several o f the dominant dichot-
omies o f modern society w i l l reveal the poli t i-
cal impact o f categorization that finds one 
either in accordance with or in opposition to 
autonomous rationality. The philosophical 
inappropriateness o f polarizing categories that 
are either not essentially oppositional in 
nature, or are false categories o f human life, 
w i l l simultaneously be brought to light. 
Mind/Body 
Given the Cartesian separation of mind and 
body, an association with the bodily excludes 
one from the status o f a rational knower. The 
private sphere o f modern society so ties cer-
tain people with the corporeal, constructing 
them in opposition to the authority o f the 
autonomous, rational mind of the public. This 
world o f bodies is typically characterized as 
involving parent-child relations, relations 
between the sexes, and human reproduction. 9 
Thus women, the aged, the young, the i l l and 
so forth, who have historic ties to these roles, 
are socially defined for their corporeality and 
contrary to the realm of rationality. 
However, the mind/body dichotomy is 
more insidious than this. The private realm is 
also the conceptual dumping ground o f all 
bodies that deviate from the white, male 
corporeal norm. Paradoxically, the public mind 
does have a bodily form. Embodying the ru-
bric o f the public and the rational mind is the 
trim, conservatively dressed, neither old nor 
young, white male. This figure is the norm, 
and is thus rendered irrelevant in society's 
assessment o f bodies. The newspapers do not 
say "White adult man robs bank." Contrary 
bodily figures, however, are highly relevant, 
used to define the identity of the individual. 
Newspapers do say "black man..." or "elderly 
woman..." or "handicapped gi r l . . . " or "hunch-
back robs bank." These bodies count for their 
difference, and are polarized from the standard 
o f measure, the neutral body that houses the 
rational mind. One is either mind or body, but 
not both. Categorized in opposition to the 
mind o f autonomous reason and all its status 
are people o f colour, women, children, the dif-
ferently able, the aged, the obese, the "ugly," 
and any other categories o f "bodies" that devi-
ate from the chosen norm. 
The separation of mind from body addi-
tionally denies the rational knowledge born o f 
acquaintance with one's body. Thus, the 
bodily knowledge of white males goes unac-
knowledged as something inherent to human-
ity, but thereby operates as a privileged 
knowledge which no one else can access. The 
corporeal knowledge o f Others, on the other 
hand, including women's knowledge o f repro-
duction, is denigrated as mythology, witchcraft 
or "wives ' tales," and denied a rational status. 
Thus we see women excluded from ratio-
nality through their bodies. The division o f 
public and private which construes women 
with the bodily care of children and adults, 
with food, clothing and so on, reinforces and 
is reinforced by women's corporeal identity. A 
similar phenomenon is found with the aged. 
Simone de Beauvoir's study o f the aged con-
trasts many cultures to expose the manner in 
which Western society robs the elderly o f 
knowing authority. 1 0 Similarly, Blacks have 
been historically viewed as less intelligent than 
whites, defined predominantly for uncommon 
physical and sexual capacities. Differently able 
people similarly continue the struggle to be 
regarded as knowing beings, rather than as 
bodies first. 
Autonomy/Dependence 
Descartes's rational mind is very much auton-
omous, with the correct order o f reasoning 
determined by the natural operations of the 
mind alone." Indeed, the Cartesian practice of 
sitting alone in meditation is the epitome of 
atomistic existence. Contractarians explicitly 
dichotomized this principle in separating the 
contracting life of the self-contained individual 
from the family realm of mutuality. Hobbes's 
individual who contracts into society, and 
Rawls 's disembodied individual behind the 
veil o f ignorance, both act out o f an atomized 
self-interest dissociated from a social context. 
Modernity thus distinguishes interconnected-
ness from autonomy, and opposes it to the 
rubric of rationality. A s a result of this dichot-
omy, individuals whose existence is evidently 
defined by dependent or even interdependent 
relations are denied the authority that comes 
with autonomous rationality. 
It is white privileged men who have his-
torically been, and been able to become, the 
most autonomous, relatively speaking. Rawls's 
stripped-down individual who impartially 
shaped society behind the veil of ignorance 
cannot be Black, or female, or poor, or sick. 
This individual can be decontextualized to 
stand separate from racial, gender, class and 
other questions of emancipation only i f he is 
of a privileged group. Thus the modern ideal 
o f autonomy transcends the contextual prob-
lems o f human life, which, by definition, af-
flict more dependent people. A s Lorraine Code 
points out, people whose socially and political-
ly constructed lack of autonomy denies them 
full moral agency renders them subject to 
paternalistic control. 1 2 This ideal o f autonomy 
thus works to keep less autonomous peoples 
oppressed. Black women, for example, must 
explicitly fight the ideal in attempts to em-
power themselves. 
By being accountable to others, African-
American women develop more fully hu-
man, less objectified selves. Sonia Sanchez 
points to this version of self by stating, 
"we must move past always focusing on 
the 'personal self because there's a larger 
self. There's a 'self of black people." 
Rather than defining self in opposition to 
others, the connectedness among individ-
uals provides Black women deeper, more 
meaningful self-definitions.13 
The autonomy/dependency split disrespects the 
dependents for their natural human condition, 
leaving them with a lack o f authority and 
thereby no means to attain the valued 
autonomy. This ideal is further destructive for 
oppressed groups by encouraging a fragmented 
community. 
Denouncing the philosophical appropriate-
ness of the autonomy/dependence polarity, A n -
nette Baier suggests that Cartesian individuals 
can be nothing but interdependent "second 
persons" in their communication with one an-
other. Lorraine Code discusses second 
personhood: 
It is true ... that Descartes does not 
consider language essential to thought. But 
behind this Cartesian disbelief lies not just 
a distrust of language, but a failure to 
notice how much that very distrust de-
pends on language itself. Indeed, Alasdair 
Maclntyre suggests that it is just because 
his knowledge of languages (i.e., French 
and Latin) is "invisible to ... Descartes" 
that he overlooks the extent to which his 
radical doubting leaves undoubted those 
very languages whose structures order 
"both thought and the world expressed in 
a set of meanings." ... The theoretical 
mode is dependent on habits and skills 
acquired in the speaking (embodied) mode, 
in a tradition that Descartes could have 
absorbed only as a second person, a person 
who conversed with and was taught by 
others.14 
People are essentially social creatures that 
l ive through language and community. Conse-
quently, the ideal o f autonomy not only deval-
ues but ignores the real interdependence that 
people face daily, that should be at the fore o f 
political and philosophical debate. Therefore, 
the supposedly real autonomy/dependence d i -
chotomy tied to the public/private realms is 
false as we l l as grounded in oppressive ideals, 
privileging and subordinating particular groups 
on its terms. 
Impartiality/Locality 
Cartesianism's autonomous mind and the uni-
versal individual o f contractarian perspectives 
have sustained a myth o f an impartial human 
standpoint that is the backbone o f modern sci-
ence and ethics. Iris Mar ion Young ' s analysis 
o f the impartiality o f modern rationality des-
cribes its transcendent quality. 
As a characteristic of reason, impartiality 
means something different from the prag-
matic attitude of being fair, considering 
other people's needs and desires as well 
as one's own. Impartiality names a point 
of view of reason that stands apart from 
any interests and desires. Not to be partial 
means being able to see the whole, how 
all the particular perspectives and interests 
in a given moral situation relate to one 
another in a way that, because of its par-
tiality, each perspective cannot see itself. 
The impartial moral reasoner thus stands 
outside of and above the situation about 
which he or she reasons, with no stake in 
it, or is supposed to adopt an attitude to-
ward a situation as though he or she were 
outside and above it. 1 5 
Y o u n g draws on Theodor Adorno's "logic o f 
identity" to characterize rationality's reduction 
o f the objects in question in efforts to attain a 
universal, common perspective. 1 6 
The logic of identity consists in an unre-
lenting urge to think things together, in a 
unity, to formulate a representation of the 
whole, a totality. This desire itself is at 
least as old as Parmenides, and the logic of 
identity begins with the ancient philosophi-
cal notion of universals. Through the no-
tion of an essence, thought brings concrete 
particulars into unity. As long as qualita-
tive difference defines essence, however, 
the pure program of identifying thought re-
mains incomplete. Concrete particulars are 
brought into unity under the universal 
form, but the forms themselves cannot be 
reduced to unity. 
The problem with the logic of identity 
is that through it thought seeks to have 
everything under control, to eliminate all 
uncertainty and unpredictability, to idealize 
the bodily fact of sensuous immersion in a 
world that outruns the subject, to eliminate 
otherness.17 
The cognito with its attendant autonomous 
individualism is an expression o f pure tran-
scendence, from which modernity strives to 
understand all in a unified system with itself. 1 8 
Modern rationality thus seeks to eliminate par-
ticulars and human difference to fulfil its quest 
for an impartial stance. 
The effect o f this process is to set up a 
hierarchical dichotomy of universality and 
locality that values the former over the latter. 
The political problem is that impartiality 
reduces differences between people that should 
remain meaningful in rational deliberation. For 
example, the impartiality o f modern reason 
that guides both science and ethics demand 
that I ignore matters o f race, class, gender and 
age when deliberating upon a human problem, 
as though they were not there. 
Because researchers have widely differing 
values, experiences, and emotions, genuine 
science is thought to be unattainable 
unless all human characteristics except 
rationality are eliminated from the 
research process. ...scientists aim to 
distance themselves from the values, 
vested interests, and emotions generated 
by their class, race, sex, or unique 
situation. By decontextualizing them-
selves, they allegedly become detached 
observers and manipulators of nature.... 
Moreover, this researcher decontextual-
ization is paralleled by comparable efforts 
to remove the objects of study from their 
contexts. The result of this entire process 
is often the separation of information 
from meaning.1 9 
Thinking about people as interchangeable, re-
duced beings of sameness in order to achieve 
a universal perspective is to deny that individ-
ual difference and location make a political 
difference. The outcome o f such impartiality is 
the dismissal and thereby further entrenchment 
of the political difference that does exist from 
group to group. 
Moreover, the attempt to set aside values 
and local experience, and to rely fully on rea-
son, is to assume that rationality's modern 
terms are themselves unerringly impartial. 
Philosophically, impartiality/partiality is an 
inappropriate distinction to draw in human life 
since we all stand locally in relation to others. 
The idea that we can transcend our difference 
is just as problematic as the idea that we 
should. A s Robert Paul Wol f f says o f Kant's 
universality, "despite his overriding concern 
for moral matters, Kant seems never to have 
asked himself the fundamental questions, 
'What is it for one man to stand in a real rela-
tion to another man? '" 2 0 Or to a woman, an 
aboriginal girl , or a poor Black man? Baier's 
critique o f purported human autonomy equally 
denounces our capacity to attain a transcen-
dental rationality from which to judge society 
impartially. 
The desire to achieve an impartial rational-
ity is met in practice by a local perspective 
masquerading as a universal perspective. Fa l l -
ing along gender, class, age, ethnic and racial 
lines, this dominant standpoint belongs to 
white, privileged, neither old nor young, men 
— with their vision constructing the dominant 
theories o f rationality and justice. Indeed, we 
see that the world's small contingent o f white, 
heterosexual, adult, propertied men are never 
labelled an "interest group," while women o f 
colour (the largest group in the world), as well 
as other communities, consistently are. Thus it 
is by defining this dominant group's position 
as "impartial" that we privilege it as rational, 
and denounce all Other perspectives as oppos-
ing in their partiality, which simultaneously 
construes them with the non-rational. 
Subject/Object 
Autonomous, impartial rationality is the hall-
mark o f modern science, characterized by the 
subject's distanced study o f an object. A s a 
consequence of the hierarchical, dichotomous 
thought that informs social life as wel l as sci-
ence, and because o f the social valorization o f 
scientific principles, this subject/object dichot-
omy is also found in everyday life. 
The subject-object relation that the auton-
omy of reason credo underwrites is at once 
its most salient and its most politically sig-
nificant epistemological consequence. The 
relation pivots on two assumptions: that 
there is a sharp split between subject and 
object and that it is a primary purpose of 
cognitive activity to produce the ability to 
control, manipulate, and predict the behav-
ior of its objects.... 
The subject is removed from, detached 
from, positions himself at a distance from 
the object; and knows the object as other 
than himself... Understanding the object 
of inquiry, where it figures at all among 
epistemic concerns, is of minimal signif-
icance. In fact, a subject's demonstrated 
ability to manipulate, predict, and control 
the behavior of his objects of knowledge 
is commonly regarded as the evidence par 
excellence that he knows them.2' 
The subject/object play in everyday life 
sustains the hierarchies o f sexism, racism, 
classism and other systemic forms o f op-
pression. It either acknowledges or dismisses 
the subjective essence o f individuals on the 
basis o f their race, class, gender, age and so 
on, identifying white privileged man as "sub-
ject" and the marginalized as "object." For 
example, racism and sexism refuse to recog-
nize the person in question as a subject of her 
existence with whom one can identify. Patricia 
Col l ins reflects upon the treatment received by 
Black women domestic workers, whose status 
as non-subjects is established by employers 
who call them "girls ," or by carrying on con-
versations with others in front o f the worker as 
though she were non-existent. 2 2 Such denial o f 
subjectivity is also evident for the aged. 
The crippling and undermining potential 
of a failure to know is illustrated in May 
Sarton's story of Caroline Spencer, an 
elderly, intermittently confused patient in 
a nursing home, who is reduced by her 
"keepers" to the sum of her moments of 
confusion. They ignore all manifestations 
of her lucid, creative, and self-aware cog-
nitive agency. Treating her as merely a 
senile patient, positioned in a routine and 
a set of expectations that make of her a 
simple category, they can forget that she 
is the subject of her own experiences.23 
Similarly, women are consistently identified in 
visual terms, experienced by men as objects. 
Everyday dialogue reveals that men's ex-
pressed identity is grounded in internal traits 
such as intellect and character, while women's 
identity is tied in external physical traits. "He 
is an interesting businessman with a lot o f 
integrity." "She is a beautiful businesswoman 
who charms every client she encounters." Men 
see; women are seen. 
The subject/object dichotomy thus reveals 
who has the power o f defining, and who is 
being defined. Revealing vision to be modern-
ity's privileged sense,2 4 members o f marginal-
ized groups are identified visually by eyes 
other than their own, even amongst them-
selves. Their visible age, gender, race and 
ethnicity are the terms in which they are con-
ceptualized and held at a distance. Through 
this subject/object split, then, the dominant 
white male group becomes the " I " o f everyone 
— o f philosophy, science, media and collo-
quial conversation. This is the standpoint o f 
society, from which all others are observed, 
assessed, and held captive in their lacking 
authority as rational subjects. This philosoph-
ical denial of all individuals as subjects of 
their own experience is reiterated in the polit-
ical marginalization of the non-subjects. Seen 
from afar, these objects are out there to be 
manipulated and controlled, not respected and 
interacted with as rational subjects with equal 
human authority. 
Reason/Emotion 
The most explicit category of "not-rational" is 
that of emotion, conceptualized oppositionally 
to reason itself. Women's relegation to the 
private sphere immediately defines them as 
"passionate" beings; their role in human repro-
duction is perhaps the starting point for this 
assignment. A s the Oxford Dictionary says, 
"woman" is the "the feminine emotions" and 
"a way of accounting for man's inexplicable 
[i.e., irrational] conduct"; and "womanly" 
means " o f woman or her feelings." 2 5 Black 
men are also emotionally stereotyped as un-
controllably sexual creatures against which 
white women must be protected by the white 
male legal and penal system. Black women's 
alleged emotional, passionate nature has been 
used to justify their sexual exploitation as 
"Jezebels," relegation to the role o f nurturing 
"mammy," 2 6 and denigration as those without 
a capacity for sound judgment. 2 7 White 
middle-class men, on the other side o f the 
dichotomy, are notoriously alienated from their 
emotions. Some go so far as to retreat into the 
woods en masse, naked, to beat on drums and 
smoke long pipes in efforts to access their 
emotive selves. 
Mar i lyn Frye's " A Note on Anger" 2 8 ac-
counts for how differently men's and women's 
anger is assessed. While men's anger is 
received as rational and deserving response, 
women's anger, especially public anger, is 
denounced as "hysterical." 2 9 Thus the reason/ 
emotion dichotomy not only encourages some 
people to be emotively expressive and others 
to suppress their emotions, 3 0 it also results in 
assessments of emotion that are contingent 
upon the identity of the individual. With male-
ness conflated with rationality, men's emotions 
are subsumed under the umbrella of ratio-
nality. Women, their femaleness construed 
with emotive nurturing, are deemed passionate 
(as the objects o f the subject's passion), and 
thereby opposed to reason. Thus the reason/ 
emotion dichotomy fabricates an oppositional 
nature between rationality and emotion by 
changing its terms to who the individual is. 
Such a polarization denies the fact that all 
humans are at least in part rationally informed 
by their emotions. A s they did in traditions 
preceding the Enlightenment, philosophers are 
again increasingly attending to the role that 
emotion plays in rational judgment. For exam-
ple, Patricia Greenspan speaks to the debate 
that explores not simply //"emotions are con-
nected to reason, but how. 
[M]y own view depends on not relegating 
passion to a separate status or sphere, with 
reason's commands interpreted as 
deliverances from on high, but treating it 
instead, one might say, as a somewhat 
independent member of the reason family. 
The link to judgment via evaluation is 
crucial to this alternative since it gives us 
a new way of cutting into the conventional 
emotion/reason contrast. Instead of treating 
emotion as opposed to reason, 
judgmentalism, the view I have argued 
against, may be seen as attempting to do 
away with the contrast by analyzing 
emotions as modifications of judgment, as-
sumed to be reason's basic instrument. But 
this is accomplished at the cost of ascrib-
ing to emotions no role in practical 
reasoning besides that of judgment. The 
alternative view I have defended here anal-
yzes emotions as sharing a common con-
tent with evaluative judgments and thus a 
rational (justificatory) role in the genera-
tion of action.3 1 
Alison Jaggar embeds this point in the modern 
social context. 
Within the context of western culture, ... 
people have often been encouraged to 
control or even suppress their emotions. 
Consequently, it is not unusual for people 
to be unaware of their emotional state or 
to deny it to themselves and others. This 
lack of awareness, especially combined 
with a neopositivist understanding of emo-
tion that construes it just as a feeling of 
which one is aware, lends plausibility to 
the myth of dispassionate investigation. 
But the lack of awareness of emotions cer-
tainly does not mean that emotions are not 
present subconsciously or unconsciously or 
that subterranean emotions do not exert a 
continuing influence on people's articu-
lated values and observations, thoughts, 
and actions.32 
The dispassionate ethicist, the scientist, the 
universal rational mind o f the public are ex-
cused from being accountable for their emo-
tions by the dichotomous claim that their 
rationality excludes emotionality. The private 
Others, however, are conversely tied inescap-
ably to their emotions and thus denied the au-
thority that comes with reason, while remain-
ing at the mercy o f the unexamined emotions 
o f the group in power. The modern conception 
of emotions as acultural "gut responses" deep-
ens the extent to which emotions, unaccounted 
for, hold the oppressed hostage. The fact that 
emotions are in part socially constructed to 
perpetuate society's structures o f domination is 
kept beyond the scope o f rational critique by 
the reason/emotion divide. Our socialized 
emotional ties to homophobia, racism, classism 
and contempt for women thus remain highly 
impervious to change. 3 3 
Reconceptualizing: 
Some Considerations 
While this critique o f rationality has revealed 
its oppressive and philosophically troubled 
foundation, this is not to say that humanity 
should abandon its rational capacities. Rather, 
it is to say that the individual's identity as a 
rational being must be recast in ways that are 
philosophically more defensible and politically 
liberating. In efforts to reconceptualize the 
terms of modern rationality, then, the dangers 
o f hierarchical dichotomy are more relevant 
than ever. Valor iz ing the denigrated side o f the 
dichotomy threatens an essentialism that can 
be used to justify the segregation of women, 
people o f colour, the aged, the poor, the sick 
and so on, from mainstream civic life. A n al-
ternative danger lays in legitimizing the values 
o f the status quo by encouraging the marginal-
ized to "make it" on modernity's terms. The 
answer must involve some play with each o f 
these dangers, exploring the fruits o f both 
paths without buying wholesale into one or the 
other. The underlying purpose must be to re-
constitute rationality such that it is no longer 
a paradigm of hierarchical dichotomy, to reject 
this underlying ideology itself. 
Al lan Gibbard's examination o f rationality 
as the acceptance of norms that permit it 
frames this project o f reconceptualization. 
The main thing to be explained is not what 
a norm is, but what "accepting a norm" is 
— or, more precisely, what it is for 
something to be permitted or required by 
the norms a person "accepts." ... 
Take next some schematic illustrations. 
Delilah, suppose, is pondering whether 
various of Samson's acts, beliefs, and feel-
ings are rational. What is it for her to 
come to an opinion? It is to come to ac-
cept norms. ... Nothing I have said here, 1 
stress, speaks to whether Samson's acts, 
beliefs, and emotions really were rational. 
... My own analysis ... is a hypothesis 
about what it is to think or believe some-
thing rational.... It follows that if we want 
to decide what really is rational, we shall 
have to settle what norms to accept our-
selves — for that is what it is to form an 
opinion as the rationality of something.34 
Gibbard's argument, without sliding fully into 
postmodern relativity, echoes the Foucaultian 
idea o f community standards and rules which 
individuals must meet and follow. Indeed, 
underlying this paper's critique of "rationality" 
is the assertion that its terms are largely con-
structed by a certain sociopolitico-economic 
group, and maintained by many i f not most. 
A n individual's authority is determined ac-
cording to her fulfilment o f these norms, with 
her oppression sustained by her incapacity to 
gain authority, regardless of the fact that she 
may play by the rules. Relieving the oppres-
sive terms of this rationality thus demands a 
shift in these "rules." 
According, then, to this paper's critique o f 
modern rationality, reconceptualizations must 
aim to explode the dichotomous thinking that 
surrounds and supports it. This is a tall order, 
with no self-evident starting point. Modern 
society is an apparent seamless series o f 
dichotomies that feed into and are fed by one 
another in a system of mutual justification. 
Just as the impartiality/locality split supports 
and is supported by the autonomy/dependence 
split, so is this supportive of and supported by 
the reason/emotion dualism, and all of which 
feed on and into the public/private division of 
social life. Yet for the same reason that this 
system has no single starting point, it does not 
need one. Breaking down any of the dichoto-
mies contributes to a breakdown in the others, 
which then feed back in to further alter the 
chosen starting point. Therefore, the question 
is not where, but how to begin. 
Changing the rules o f the paradigm of 
rationality can be either o f a substantive or 
procedural format. Respecting the purpose o f 
the project — to establish a more inclusive 
and democratic epistemological framework — 
the revision must be one o f procedure so that 
the substantive questions can be continually 
debated and answered anew through the social 
activity o f the revised process. Then, much in 
the same way that the dichotomies reciprocally 
determine one another, individual agency can 
inform and be informed by changing epistemo-
logical terms. Foucault's analysis o f power and 
discipline in prison life is helpful here. As he 
says: 
The question is often posed as to how, 
before and after the Revolution, a new 
foundation was given to the right to 
punish. And no doubt the answer is to be 
found in the theory of the contract. But it 
is perhaps more important to ask the re-
verse question: how were people made to 
accept the power to punish, or quite 
simply, when punished, tolerate being 
so?3 5 
Responding to Foucault, Lorraine Code points 
out that this reciprocity leaves scope for 
human agency. 
It is clear, for example, that the panoptic 
regime of a disciplinary society works best 
— is most successful in producing "docile 
bodies" — when members of the society 
are complicit, self-surveillant. Social-
institutional discipline produces subjective 
self-discipline; subjective conformity 
confirms and consolidates social regimes. 
On this reciprocity the continuous, smooth 
capillary circulation of power depends. Yet 
it is this very reciprocity that, to quote de 
Lauretis, "leaves open a possibility of 
agency and self-determination at the 
subjective and even individual level of 
micro-political and everyday practices." 
Subjects can refuse to reciprocate, to speak 
from within hegemonic discourse....36 
Refusals to reciprocate according to mod-
ern epistemic norms are evident in political 
consciousness movements, in the outlaw emo-
tions o f which Al i son Jaggar speaks, 3 7 in 
Black women's determined self-definition ex-
pressed in blues songs. 3 8 The starting point for 
a new epistemology is the gathering of partial 
community where, together, the refusal to reit-
erate the hegemonic discourse develops into 
the determination to share a new subjective 
discourse. The validation process o f commu-
nity leads to subcultures, which may feed into 
the dominant culture, subversively sparking 
epistemological and political change. This 
paper's critique o f modern rationality is itself 
an example o f such challenge to dominant 
norms, with my ideas and perspectives being 
validated and developed in a particular com-
munity, from which I w i l l carry them into 
different communities. 
However, whose challenges to the 
dominant epistemology should be trusted? This 
question can best be answered by a reliance 
again on an open process, which must be con-
structed to give a constant voice to al l commu-
nities, to keep questions o f power, prejudice 
and bias bubbling to the surface for examin-
ation. The continuing interplay o f local stand-
points, rather than submission to the 
reductivism o f transcendent ideals, is the most 
democratic means to establish the most con-
textually fair social outcomes. Such an empha-
sis on process also undercuts the essentialist/ 
constructivist dichotomy by allowing individ-
uals and communities to continually redefine 
and shape themselves. 
The Academy, which finds itself at the 
heart o f mainstream authoritative knowledge, 
must seek ways to bring this interplay o f com-
munities within its parameters. Its role in the 
production and dissemination o f knowledge 
brings with it an acute responsibility in initi-
ating epistemic change in line with democratic 
principles. The Academy must begin acknowl-
edging the nature o f the knowledge system 
that it defines and perpetuates, and open up a 
critical dialogue about that system. Given the 
struggle within the discipline o f philosophy 
alone to recast epistemological study into the 
question o f "whose knowledge?" a general 
academic recognition o f the need for change 
w i l l be hard won. Such a recognition in itself 
demands a restructuring o f mainstream values 
that puts ethics on an equal footing with the 
power o f rationality. 
This process o f epistemological dialogue 
and change is a process that asks privileged 
groups to relinquish their power over others. 
A s such, the standpoint approach that seeks to 
use a marginalized group's lives as a starting 
point for knowledge inquiry would prima facie 
sour the dominant group's patience with the 
project. Ask ing white male students and 
faculty to entertain the idea o f life from the 
standpoint o f Third Wor ld women is simply 
too large an initial leap. Alternatively, C o l -
lins's and bell hooks's theory o f privilege and 
oppression as multiple interlocking systems 
within a greater matrix o f hierarchy and dom-
ination would likely be less threatening to the 
uninitiated. This approach's ideological focus 
which recognizes that all people f i l l multiple 
roles of both domination and oppression better 
casts all individuals as having similar human 
goals o f emancipation, creating new room for 
dialogue. 
The significance of seeing race, class, and 
gender as interlocking systems of oppres-
sion is that such an approach fosters a 
paradigmatic shift of thinking inclusively 
about other oppressions, such as age, sexu-
al orientation, religion and ethnicity.... 
Placing African-American women and 
other excluded groups in the center of 
analysis opens up possibilities for a both/ 
and conceptual stance, one in which all 
groups possess varying amounts of penalty 
and privilege in one historically created 
system. ... Depending on the context, an 
individual may be an oppressor, a member 
of an oppressed group, or simultaneously 
oppressor and oppressed.39 
Hooks names modern epistemology a "politic 
o f domination" which: 
is a belief in domination, and a belief in 
the notions of superior and inferior, which 
are components of all those systems [of 
oppression]. For me it's like a house, they 
share the foundation, but the foundation is 
the ideological belief around which notions 
of domination are constructed.40 
B y making sense o f different kinds o f oppres-
sion by ideologically tying them together, this 
new perspective emphasizes individual ac-
countability to a world that is theirs, a world 
which can be changed through human agency. 
The use o f narrative to communicate the 
political and philosophical relevance of partial 
perspective should be expanded in academia. 
Such partiality would begin to demonstrate 
that human knowledge is a social construct, as 
well as reground people in human context 
from where they can permit themselves to see 
the world from a local perspective. With the 
recognition of all cognitive activity as local 
activity and human experience as second per-
sonhood, narrative can be discovered as a rich 
epistemological resource. 4 1 Literature can help 
crack open this world of individual and group 
partiality, revealing the relevance o f human 
difference, of emotion to rational decision-
making, and o f individual responsibility for 
one's world. Increased academic involvement 
with communities must also be prioritized to 
stimulate dialogue and new understanding of 
the oppression that occurs on the cultural 
level. Deliberately encouraging and making 
space for specific community voices on cam-
pus, through literature, or from the greater 
community, can begin to shed light on and 
give validity to alternative subjugated knowl-
edges and their conceptual differences. On the 
institutional level, universities are a conserva-
tive site of knowledge construction, as well as 
a place for challenging authority, albeit typi-
cally more administrative than academic. St i l l , 
society's rising interest in and commitment to 
feminist and Black thought is probably strong-
est amongst academics. Thus, the academy's 
push for dialogue and inclusiveness can and 
must be pursued at the individual, community, 
and institutional levels, since it is at all three 
levels that oppression and privilege are 
experienced. 
Conclusions 
Autonomous rationality has been presented 
historically as the democratizing force o f mod-
ern liberalism, that which grants us all equal 
human status and opportunity. However, as we 
have discovered, the autonomous terms o f this 
rationality, its polarization from femaleness, 
corporeality, partiality, interdependence and 
emotion, and its conflation with maleness, 
public, impartiality and mind, renders it a cate-
gory o f exclusion. This force for democracy 
has instead proven itself to be a source o f 
political domination. The dichotomies through 
which modern rationality asserts itself consist 
of false oppositions and traits that no human 
individual can or should attain. A s such, the 
political push for a revision o f rationality and 
its paradigm is accompanied by a philosoph-
ical quest for greater consistency and rele-
vance to the human condition. 
The marginalized groups that fall outside 
the authority of the rational individual cannot 
find empowerment through a simple subsump-
tion into this privileged category. To be in-
cluded in the brotherhood o f Cartesianism and 
the social contract, these women, people o f 
colour, the poor, the old and the others, would 
be asked to reject their bodies and selves, 
since this brotherhood is itself an ideology that 
necessarily separates itself from "otherness." 
A s Patricia H i l l Col l ins says, "those individu-
als who stand at the margins o f society clarify 
its boundaries. African-American women [and 
other marginalized groups], by not belonging, 
emphasize the significance o f belonging." 4 2 
Thus, the project o f empowerment must create 
a new process that grants a consistent voice to 
all groups, such that political questions are 
constantly at the fore o f social dialogue. 
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